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'There is ... much difference to my eyes between the leaded bour-
geois type of a Times article and the slovenly print of an evening
halfpenny paper .... "
-Sherlock Holmes, The Hound of the Baskervillesi
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of personal computers and desktop publishing,
the use of customized typefaces and fonts2 is becoming commonplace.
Companies such as International Typeface Corporation (ITC), Mono-
type, Apple, Adobe Systems, and Microsoft are heavily involved in
the typeface and font industry, employing artisans to develop type-
faces and skilled engineers to encode those typefaces into fonts, and
licensing the typefaces and fonts into products.3 Adobe Systems alone
spent 5.8 million dollars on typeface production in fiscal 1992.4 It
may come as a surprise to many to discover that much of the product
of this industry is afforded little or no copyright protection. In the
1. ARi-HuR C. DOYLE, THE HoUND OF THE BAsKERvn.Es, reprinted in 2 THE ANNO-
TATED SHERLOCK Hotmais 22 (William S. Baring-Gould ed., Clarkson N. Potter, Inc. 1978)
(1967).
2. As used in this comment, the word "typeface" refers to the formations of the printed
letters. A "typeface" can be defined as a set of letters, numbers, or other symbolic characters,
whose forms are related by repeating design elements consistently applied in a notational system
and are intended to be embodied in articles whose intrinsic utilitarian function is for use in
composing text or other cognizable combinations of characters. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668.
The term "typeface" means a set of letters, alphabets, numerals, figurative signs,
punctuation marks, and the like, intended to provide the means for composing text
by any graphic technique such as printing. Typefaces are distinguished one from
the other by the differences in the repeating design elements consistently applied
throughout the typeface. These design elements may be limitless, and include
such aspects as the degree of stroke contrast, angle of emphasis, stroke shape,
serif or non-serif (sanserif), curved form, and arch form.
Eltra v. Ringer, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 198 (E.D. Va. 1976) (Eltra 1), aff'd on other grounds, 579
F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978).
A typeface is distinguished from a "font," which is an article "in which a typeface resides as
the implement of printing technology, regardless of medium or form." H.R. 1790, 102d Cong.,
Ist Sess. § 1001(b)(4) (1991) (defining "typefont"). That is, a font is the embodiment of a type-
face into an article from which the typeface may be reproduced. Examples include a font file
residing on a computer's disk, a film font used in photographic typesetting, and physical metal
type.
An alternative definition of "font" often used in the printing industry is a subset of a type-
face consisting of letters, numeral, and punctuation marks of single size and style. See United
States v. Heemsoth-Kerner Corp. (Bauer Type Foundry, Inc.) 31 C.C.P.A. 75 (1943). This is a
different sense from that employed in this article.
3. See Apple, Microsoft announce cross license agreement for outline font technology,
printer software, Businesswire, Sept. 19, 1989, available in DIALOG, Buswire file.
4. ADOBE SYSTms, INC., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (1993).
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view of some typeface designers, the lack of protection has injured
designers both economically and artistically.5
This comment discusses the options available for protecting the
intellectual property of typefaces. It reviews the requirements for
copyright protection, applies those requirements to typeface design,
and concludes that typefaces are appropriate subject matter of copy-
right. The comment goes on to analyze the problems associated with
protecting typefaces with copyright in light of the various tests for
protecting copyright in a design for a useful article.
The comment discusses the only reported case to have directly
addressed the issue of typeface copyright, Eltra v. Ringer,6 which de-
nied a writ of mandamus commanding the registration of such a copy-
right. With the benefit of hindsight and subsequent developments in
copyright law, the comment analyzes the Eltra decision and concludes
that if the case were presented today, its outcome should be to allow
copyright.
The comment presents several arguments that have been put forth
in opposition to such copyright and discusses each. It concludes that
correction of the Eltra holding through another judicial proceeding is
not likely, and proposes an amendment to the Copyright Act to permit
copyright of typeface.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR COPYRIGHT: § 102(A)
The requirements for copyrightable subject matter are set forth in
§ 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976.1 The section consists of two
parts: § 102(a) describes the requirements a work must meet to be
copyrightable, while § 102(b) describes limitations on copyrightable
subject matter. Under § 102(a), a work is subject to copyright if it is
an original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. 8 Thus, there are three requirements for a work to be subject to
copyright: it must be original, it must be fixed in tangible form, and it
must be a "work of authorship." 9
5. Electronic mail from Charles Bigelow, President, Bigelow & Holmes, Associate Pro-
fessor, Computer Science and Art, Stanford University, to Terry Carroll (June 29, 1993) (on file
with author).
6. Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978).
7. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & 1992 Supp.)).
8. "Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17
U.S.C. 102(a).
9. The approach taken by courts has varied as to whether these elements are formulated
as three requirements, or whether the elements of creative expression as a work of authorship and
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A. Originality
The requirement for originality is easily met. "Original" in this
context means only that the work has its origin in the author.10 There
is no requirement that the work be different from everything that has
come before: it need only embody a minimum level of creativity and
owe its origin to the author claiming copyright. 1 To use an extreme
example, if two poets, each working in total isolation and unaware of
one another's work, were to compose identical poems, both of the
poems would meet the originality requirement for purposes of the
copyright statute.12
When a typeface designer produces a typeface, the work
originates with that designer. Certainly the design of the typeface is
constrained by the requirement that the typeface be recognizable as
letters, and the shapes of the letters are, after all, elements in the pub-
lic domain. 3 However, in designing a typeface, the designer adds
much more than the mere forms of the letters. Any copyright that
might subsist in a typeface design would encompass only those added
elements, and not the forms of the letters themselves.' 4
B. Fixation
The fixation requirement is also not a significant hurdle for the
copyright of typeface design. A work is "fixed" when it is embodied
in a medium of expression with sufficient permanence that it may be
perceived for more than a transitory period.'
In the case of a typeface, there are at least two methods of easily
meeting the fixation requirement. First, and most simply, the typeface
that of originality are treated as a single requirement with two subparts: originality and creativity.
See Baltimore Orioles, Inc., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987). In some approaches, the phrase "original works of
authorship" is taken as a whole, incorporating both the originality and creativity requirements.
See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 355-57 (1991).
10. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
11. Id. at 101-104.
12. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-46.
13. An element in the public domain is one that is not subject to copyright. Sieff v. Conti-
nental Auto Supply, 39 F. Supp. 683, 688 (D. Minn. 1941). Public domain sources are available
to be used by anyone. Sawyer v. Crowell Pub. Co., 46 F. Supp. 471,474 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), affd
142 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944).
14. "The copyright in a ... derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the
author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and
does not employ any exclusive right in the preexisting material." 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
15. "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy
or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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may be depicted on sheets of paper. Alternatively, the typeface may
be embodied into a font, from which the typeface may be perceived by
ordinary use of the font to print text.
C. Work of Authorship
Typefaces, at least certain of them, are sufficiently creative works
of expression to rise to the level of works of authorship. A typeface's
use is not merely to communicate, but also to express. This may be
seen from examining how typefaces are used and designed.
In the advertising industry, a typeface is chosen with great care,
not just for the strictly utilitarian functions of clarity and readability,
but for its ability to evoke a particular image or feeling in the con-
sumer. As one commentator has noted, "[a]s long as people will pe-
ruse the printed word, designers, art directors, writers, and editors will
agonize over the choice of a typeface."16  Advertisers characterize
typefaces as "having a raw, urgent, look,"17 "suggesting stretching,"
18
or as "the perfect typeface for imagining the body behind the words in
this sweet ad."19 Typefaces are carefully chosen for such subtle ef-
fects as allusion to a historical period, a sense of modernity, or "at-
mosphere value."20
It is also worth noting the opinions expressed by typeface design-
ers of their craft. Renowned typeface designer Hermann Zapf be-
lieved that a typeface necessarily embodies the expression of the time
in which it was designed." Frederick W. Goudy, perhaps the most
famous typeface designer of the 20th century, described the design of
a typeface:
The perfect model for a type letter is altogether imaginary; there is
no copy for the designer today except the form created by some
earlier artist, and the excellence of a designer's work depends en-
tirely upon the degree of imagination and feeling he can include in
16. Anthony Vagnoni, Editorial, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 3, 1992, at 3C.
17. Bob Blewett, The Big Face Off, It's Their Words (For And) Against Yours, As We Ask
Font-wise Professionals to Air Their Love/hate Relationship With Advertising Typography (pt.
1), ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 3, 1992, at 8C.
18. Id.
19. Jim Poole, The Big Face Off; It's Their Words (For And) Against Yours, As We Ask
More Font-wise Professionals to Air Their Love/hate Relationship With Advertising Typography
(pt. 2), ADvERTSING Ar, Oct. 5, 1992, at 21C.
20. Electronic mail from Charles Bigelow, President, Bigelow & Holmes, Associate Pro-
fessor, Computer Science and Art, Stanford University, to Terry Carroll (Oct. 9, 1992) (on file
with author).
21. Hermann Zapf, The Expression Of Our Time In Typography, Lecture Delivered at
Gallery 303, New York City (May 2, 1966), in HERITAGE OF rM GRAPnc ARTs 2-17 (Chandler
B. Grannis, ed., 1972).
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the rendition of that traditional form .... But form alone is not
enough; type must show life and power, that is, expression. Many
types have correct enough forms, yet lack entirely that vibrant qual-
ity of life and vigor which comes naturally from the hand of a
craftsman who is intent on personal expression and is not merely
attempting to display his draftsmanship for an exact and precise
finish.22
Behavioral studies verify that the value of a typeface derives
from its aesthetics, and not from any utilitarian purpose. Studies show
that variation of typeface has little impact on utilitarian aspects of
typeface, such as the readability of text and the legibility of words.23
In the studies performed by Paterson and Tinker,24 of the readability
of various typefaces in common use, the typefaces were found, in gen-
eral, to be equally readable. These tests found that there were no sig-
nificant differences among the rates of reading text in 8 of the 10
typefaces tested.' Only two of the tested typefaces, "American Type-
writer" and "Old English," were found to have any significant differ-
22. FREDERICK W. GouDy, TYPOLOGiA: Sturnas IN TYPE DESIGN AND TYPE MAKING 40-
41 (1940). Goudy continues:
Type design involves craftsmanship of a high order, but good technique alone is
not enough. A design devoid of emotion, rhythm, and expression, yet technically
excellent, merely betrays the fact that it has been produced by one who has noth-
ing of value to express. To produce a line by mere mechanical deftness is one
thing; to draw a line of delicacy and refinement, subtle and expressive, instinct
with life, vigor, and variety, is something else, and can be done only by one who
possesses strongly a due regard and feeling for these qualities. In any types of
distinction, the qualities of interest and personality, beauty and charm, are essen-
tial, and when the type exhibits them, fine technique, while desirable, is of secon-
dary importance.
Id. at 69.
23. Clive Lewis & Peter Walker, Typographical Influences on Reading, 80 BRrr. J.
PSYCHOL. 241, 243 (1989). See also Donald G. Paterson & Miles A. Tinker, Studies of Typo-
graphical Factors Influencing Speed of Reading, 16 J. APPtaED PSYCHOL. 605 (1932); Miles A.
Tinker & Donald G. Paterson, Influences of Type Form on Speed of Reading, 12 J. APPLIED
PSYCHoL 359 (1928).
As used here, the term "readability" refers to the ability of the subjects to read text printed
in various typefaces. In contrast, other studies have measured legibility of the individual let-
terforms, and have noted some differences in the ability to recognize individual letters (but not of
words or sentences as a whole) when perceived from various distances. See, e.g., Barbara Eliza-
beth Roethlin, Relative Legibility of Different Faces of Printing Types, 23 Am. J. PSYCHOL. 1-36
(1912); Harold E. Burtt & Coryne Basch, Legibility ofBodini, Baskerville Roman, and Chelten-
ham Type Faces, 7 J. APPLIm. PSYCHOL. 237 (1923). The extrapolation of studies of legibility
of letters printed in a particular typeface to the readability of text printed in that typeface is
questionable. Paterson & Tinker, supra, at 606.
24. Paterson & Tinker, supra note 23, at 605.
25. Id. at 609.
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ences in readability.26 Because of the specific attributes of these two
typefaces, they merit specific discussion.
American Typewriter is a non-proportional, or monospaced,
typeface.27 In the Paterson and Tinker studies, text printed in the
American Typewriter typeface was read 5.1% more slowly than text in
the other typefaces.2" This is apt to be due to the non-proportional
property of the typeface, in that the uniformity of letter size impedes
the perception of characteristic word forms.29
The other typeface that showed differences in readability was Old
English,30 a heavy, ornate, decorative typeface with angular features,
also known as "Black Letter" or "Gothic."31 Generally, Old English is
not used when readability is a primary objective, but is rather used for
effect, to suggest antiquity or Germany.32 Newspaper mastheads are
frequently set in such type.3 3 In the Paterson and Tinker studies, text
printed in an Old English type was read 16.5% more slowly than other
typefaces.34
The Paterson and Tinker studies concluded that most typefaces in
common use are equally easy to read.35 Where there were deviations
from the standard of readability, as in the American Typewriter and
Old English typefaces, the typefaces were less easy to read than the
26. Id.
27. In a non-proportional typeface, every letter occupies the same amount of horizontal
space, regardless of its shape. For example, a thin letter such as 'T' takes just as much space as a
wider letter, such as "M." In contrast, in a non-proportional typeface, thin letters will occupy
less horizontal space as the wider letters. Electronic mail from Charles Bigelow, President, Big-
elow & Holmes, Associate Professor, Computer Science and Art, Stanford University, to Terry
Carroll (June 11, 1993) (on file with author). Examples of non-proportional typefaces include
the Courier and Monaco typefaces, reproduced as figures 3 and 4 in the appendix. Of the type-
faces reproduced in the appendix, Courier is the one most similar to (although far from identical
to) the American Typewriter typeface used in the Paterson and Tinker studies.
Non-proportional typefaces are used where it is important that the number of characters that
fit in a particular measured horizontal area is predictable. The best example of an application of
a non-proportional typeface is a typewriter since a typewriter advances a fixed amount of space
with each key struck, the use of a non-proportional typeface ensures that the printed characters
track the advancement of the carriage. Non-proportional typefaces are frequently used for pres-
entation of data in financial reports (because of their ability to ensure that all figures, letters,
punctuation and reference marks line up uniformly) and for representation of text of computer
program listings (because the structure of the program is more apparent when indentations, word
spaces, etc., occupy an even metric of space). Id.
28. Paterson & Tinker, supra note 23, at 609.
29. Id. at 612.
30. Id. at 609.
31. For an example of a typeface of this type, see the "BobGothic" typeface reproduced as
figure 8 in the appendix.
32. MARsHALL LEE, BoOOMAKGNG 77 (2d ed. 1979).
33. Id.
34. Paterson & Tinker, supra note 23, at 609.
35. Id. at 613.
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norm.36 No typefaces in the study were easier to read than the
norm.3 7 The studies suggest that the criterion used in selecting a type-
face is its expressive and creative characteristic, the pleasant and at-
tractive characters and design elements. Because there is no
advantage in readability of any one typeface over the norm, readability
is generally not a major factor in selecting a typeface.
Underscoring this expressive aspect is the artistry that is the aim
in a typeface design. Typefaces are commonly designed with aim to-
ward connoting a secondary meaning that complements the primary
meaning conveyed by the words in print.3" This characteristic has
been variously labeled as "congeniality," "typographical allusion,"
"atmosphere value," or "typeface personality."39
In designing a typeface, there are numerous artistic decisions to
be made. Should serifs4" be employed or should the typeface be sans
serif?4 What weight should be used for the typeface: hairline, light,
medium, demibold, bold, or extra bold? Should strokes be uniform or
stressed?42 Should the arms of letters be straight, bowed, or con-
36. Id. at 609.
37. Id.
38. Lewis & Walker, supra note 23, at 243.
39. Id.
40. A "serif' is a finishing stoke applied to a letter's stem, for example, the short horizon-
tal strokes found at the base and cap of a capital letter "I" in some typefaces. F.C. Avis, TYPE
FACE Tm ni.o.oGy 40 (1965). Several examples of typefaces with serifs are depicted in the
appendix, including Times (figure 1), New York (figure 2), Courier (figure 3), BobGothic (figure
8), Koch Roman (figure 9), and Palatino (figure 12).
41. "Sans serif' (or "sanserif") refers to a typeface without serifs. Id. at 39. Examples of
sanserif typefaces included in the appendix are Monaco (figure 4), Helvetica (figure 5), and
Geneva (figure 6).
In addition to deciding whether a typeface should include serifs, a typeface designer must
also decide what types of serif should be employed, and how the serifs interact with the body of
the letterform. A serif may be bracketed to the stem, or flat. A "bracket" is a curved connecting
line used to unite a serif with a stem; a flat serif is one not bracketed to the stem. Id. at 13, 23.
The serifs in the Times (figure 1, appendix) and New York (figure 2, appendix) typefaces are
examples of bracketed serifs; the serifs in the Courier typeface are examples of flat serifs.
Other options with regard to serifs are whether the bracket should be curved or straight, and
the degree of curve or angle employed. Serifs may be a hair line, slur, spurred, or concave stub.
A "hair line serif' is a serif consisting of a very fine line which joins the stem with little or no
bracketing. Id. at 25. A "slur serif' is a serif of bulbous formation. Id. at 43. A "spur" is a line
extending or completing a serif. Id. at 44. A "stub" is a short or rounded serif, either concave or
convex. Id. at 46.
42. "Stress" is "[tihe apparent inclination of round letters, bowls, etc., principally sug-
gested by the position of the thickest part of the curved stroke." Id. at 46. Where a typeface
employs stress, the stress may be vertical, horizontal, diagonal, or mixed. BENJAMIN
BAuamasTrR, A MAuAL oF CoMPARAI VE TyGORAPHY: TiH PANOSE SYsTEM xv (1988).
The stress is most easily observed in the capital letter "0". Examples of unstressed typefaces in
the appendix are the Courier (figure 3), Monaco (figure 4), Helvetica (figure 5), and Geneva
(figure 6) typefaces. Examples of typefaces employing horizontal stress are the Times (figure 1),
New York (figure 2), and Venice (figure 11) typefaces. Examples of typefaces employing diago-
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
cave?43 Should openings be horizontal, vertical, or wedged?' 4
Should the typeface contain extra features, such as ligatures,45 fini-
als," or flourishes?47 This is just a short list of a few of the artistic
choices made by a typeface designer.
Perhaps the most concise summary of the expressive qualities of
typeface is from a noted and respected commentator on copyright law,
the late Professor Melville B. Nimmer:
It is hardly open to debate that typeface designs may embody not
only the minimal originality and creativity necessary to support a
copyright, but may, indeed, exemplify these elements in very
marked degree. "The famous printer-designers, Foumier (1764),
and later Bondoni (1818) have laid the main stress on the aesthetic
qualities in book-making. The controversy between exponents of
the Bauhaus style and the traditionalists in typography (Reiner
1946) was not simply a question of function; it was also one of
aesthetics, and aesthetic traditions... Marderstein, like his Ameri-
can interpreter and confrere, Porter Garnett, does not admit expedi-
ence or compromise in the act of printing. Only excellence in
aesthetic fulfillment is accepted. ' 48
In summary, despite its important property of depicting text, a
typeface nonetheless has an expressive aspect that, barring any justifi-
cation for exclusion, qualifies it as a work of authorship protectable by
copyright.
nal stress include the Koch Roman (figure 9), Zapf Chancery (figure 10), and (subtly) Palatino
(figure 12) typefaces.
43. See BAUERMEISTER, supra note 42, at xvi.
44. This is a reference to the angle at which the openings of letters such as the uppercase
"C" is set. Id. at xvi. Horizontal openings are those which are horizontally parallel. The appen-
dix includes two typefaces with horizontal openings: Helvetica (figure 5) and Geneva (figure 6).
Vertical openings have the arms terminating in a single vertical line. An example of a typeface
with horizontal opening is the Monaco typeface, reproduced as figure 4. A wedge opening oc-
curs when either of the opening angles of the arms is not vertical or horizontal; Koch Roman
(figure 9) is an example. Id. at xvi.
45. A "ligature" is a set of two or more tied letters, combined to share features in common.
Avis, supra note 40, at 28. A common example is a lowercase 'T' followed by a lowercase "i",
combined so that an ornamental dot at the top of the 'T' also serves as the dot over the "i". See
the Times typeface in figure 1 for an example. Many of the typefaces reproduced in the appen-
dix include some ligatures.
46. A "finial" is a special design of a letter, used as an alternative to the standard form
when the letter is the last in a word or line. Id. at 23.
47. A "flourish" is an extension of or addition to a normal letter, or an ornamental line or
shape. Id. at 24. The appendix includes two examples of typefaces with flourishes: Zapf Chan-
cery (figure 10) and Venice (figure 11).
48. 15 OaImus COPYRIGHT REVisION LEo IS.ATvE HISTORY 1038, 1040 (1977) (state-
ment of Melville B. Nimmer, quoting B. ZAcHmISSON, LEGIBILITY OF PRINTED TExT 74 (1965)).
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H. LIMrrATIONS ON COPYRIGHT: § 102(B) AND THE PROBLEM OF
USEFUL ARTICLES
While § 102(a) describes what can be copyrighted, § 102(b)
makes clear that copyright extends only to the expression in the copy-
righted work, and not to any facts or useful aspects of the work.49
Section 102(b) denies copyright to works that would otherwise be
granted it, and limits the scope of copyright to works that do become
copyrighted.
Difficulties arise when a work of authorship that qualifies for
copyright is embodied in a useful article." A design for a useful
article qualifies as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if the
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can
be identified separately from, and that are capable of existing indepen-
dently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.51 Copyright protection
extends only to those features, and not to the utilitarian aspects.52
A. Mazer v. Stein
The seminal case dealing with the separability of expression and
utilitarian aspects of a useful article is the 1954 case of Mazer v.
Stein,53 decided under the Copyright Act of 1909. In Mazer, Reglar of
California, a lamp company operated by the plaintiff, had created a
series of lamps that incorporated statuettes depicting Balinese dancers
into the lamp bases. Reglar submitted an application to the Copyright
office to register the copyright in the statuette as a "work of art"'54 or a
"reproduction of a work of art,'' 5 and the Copyright Office registered
49. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regard-
less of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17
U.S.C. § 102(b).
50. "A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely
to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." Id. § 101.
51. "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three-
dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings,
including architectural plans. Such works shall include works of artistic crafts-
manship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be con-
sidered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be iden-
tified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
52. Id.
53. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
54. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5(g), 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978).
55. Id. § 5(h).
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the copyright. Once-the lamps were marketed, the defendant's lamp
manufacturing company copied the statuette into lamps of its own
manufacture and sold them. The plaintiff brought suit for copyright
infringement, which was dismissed for lack of copyrightable subject
matter.
56
The defendant's position was that, when an artist's works are in-
tended for articles of manufacture, the works are protected not by the
copyright law, but by design patent law,57 if at all.5 s The U.S.
Supreme Court disagreed. It noted that the predecessor statute had
restricted subject matter of copyright to "models or designs intended
to be perfected as works of the fine arts."59 The Copyright Act of
1909 had removed this limitation, and extended protection to "all the
writings of an author."' The 1909 phrase was similar in form to the
Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution that authorized federal
copyright law.61 However, the court found that the legislative history
of the 1909 Copyright Act indicated that Congress did not intend the
statutory phrase to mean that the statute went as far as the Constitution
authorized, but rather was intended to be a codification of the prac-
tices and regulations of the Copyright Office that were in effect at the
time of the statute's enactment.62 The specific regulation pointed to
by the court was the former 37 C.F.R. § 202.8:
Works of art (Class G)-(a)-In General. This class includes
works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their forms but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as artistic jew-
elry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as all works be-
longing to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings and
sculpture.63
Thus, the Court reasoned that the statuette was eligible for copy-
right under the 1909 Copyright Act as a work of artistic craftsman-
ship. This was true despite the fact that the statuette incorporated into
56. Stein v. Mazer, 111 F. Supp. 359 (D. Md. 1953), rev'd, 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1953),
ajf'd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
57. Patent law, then as now, allowed for the registration of patents for designs. Patent and
Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16 Stat. 209 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988)).
The difficulties inherent in applying design patent law to typeface are discussed, infra part
V.C.1.
58. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 205 (1954).
59. Id. at 209 (quoting the Copyright Act of 1870, § 86, 16 Stat. 212).
60. Id. at 210 (quoting the Copyright Act of 1909).
61. "Congress shall have the Power... To promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
62. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 210.
63. Id. at 212-13 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949) (revoked, Jan. 1, 1978)).
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a lamp base had a utilitarian purpose as well as an expressive one.
The court reasoned that, by terms of the Copyright Office regulation
incorporated into the Act, protection subsisted only "in so far as their
forms but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned."'
That is, the copyright extended only to the expressive aspect and not
to the utilitarian one, but the utilitarian element did not impair the
copyright on the expressive element.
In Mazer, determining the boundary between the expressive and
utilitarian elements was not difficult. The copyrightable statuette
could easily be physically separated from the uncopyrightable lamp.
The court did not need to deal with the question where a conceptual,
rather than physical, separation is needed.
B. Conceptual Separability
In the years since Mazer, the issue of conceptual separability has
frequently arisen, and courts, particularly the Second Circuit, have de-
vised a number of tests to deal with the issue. There is a clear trend
toward tests that are more and more likely to result in a finding that
typeface designs are copyrightable.
1. KieseIstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl
The 1980 case Kieselstein-Cord v- Accessories by Pearl6" articu-
lated a test under which the copyrightability of a useful article de-
pended on whether the article's design had a completely separate
ornamental use. 6 In Kieselstein-Cord, the articles in question were
two ornamental belt- buckles.67 Although the court did not expressly
articulate a test as such for conceptual separability, the court found
that there was such separability. 8 The court noted that the buckles
had a separate ornamental use, and that the utilitarian function was
"subsidiary" to the primary ornamental aspect,69 and held that the
buckles were proper subject matter of copyright.70
To apply this test to typeface, it is necessary to consider both the
expressive and utilitarian aspects of the typeface in question, and de-
termine whether the design has a completely separate ornamental use.
As noted above, the expressive aspect of a typeface is the "typeface
personality," or the typeface's ability to connote a secondary meaning
64. Id. at 212.
65. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
66. Id. at 993-94.
67. Id. at 990.
68. Id. at 993.
69. Id.
70. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993-94.
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to complement the primary meaning that is being conveyed by the
words in print.7 1 However, this is in essence a secondary aspect. By
definition, a typeface design includes the utilitarian element of repre-
senting text.72 It is not possible for the typeface to have a completely
separate ornamental function. Under the Kieselstein-Cord test, then, it
is likely that typeface design would be found not to be proper subject
matter of copyright.
2. Carol Barnhart v. Economy Cover Corporation
Carol Barnhart v. Economy Cover Corp.,73 decided in 1985, was
the first case to enunciate a test under which at least some typeface
designs might be subject to copyright. Unlike Kieselstein-Cord,
which required a completely separate use that was wholly ornamental,
Carol Barnhart embraced the first test for conceptual separability.
The Carol Barnhart court, like the Kieselstein-Cord court, noted the
House Report's language that for a useful article to be copyrightable,
it must contain some expressive element that can be identified, either
physically or conceptually, as separable from the utilitarian element.74
The Carol Barnhart court, however, took that language a step further
than the Kieselstein-Cord court, and articulated the first test incorpo-
rating a conceptual test.
The works in question in Carol Barnhart were four mannequins
of partial human torsos.75 In affirming the district court's finding that
the mannequins were not subject to copyright, the court stated that in
order for copyright to exist in a useful article, the expressive aspects of
the work must be capable of being conceptualized as existing indepen-
dently of their utilitarian function.76
This test, as applied to a typeface design, depends to a great ex-
tent on the particular typeface for which copyright is sought. A typi-
cal typeface used for the composition of text (e.g., the Times
typeface77) is not likely to be perceived as being conceptually separate
from the article in which it is embodied.78 Upon examining such a
typeface, it is the functional elements that are perceived: the shapes of
the letters and the letters' ability to represent text. On the other hand,
71. Lewis & Walker, supra note 23, at 243.
72. See note 2, supra.
73. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
74. Id. at 417 n.3.
75. Id. at 412.
76. Id. at 418.
77. See appendix, figure 1.
78. But see 15 Oimsius CopyRiGHT REVISION LEoIsLAvE HISTORY 1054, 1097 fig. 4
(1977) (depicting typeface design elements in nonsense non-letter shapes).
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in the case of most decorative typefaces, the expressive element is
quite evident upon even a cursory examination. It is apparent from
examining the "San Francisco" typeface,79 for example, that its main
purpose is not merely to portray text, but also to depict the text in a
humorous and expressive way. For other typefaces (e.g., "Koch Ro-
man"' 0), whether the expressive element is likely to be perceived as
being conceptually separate is likely to be highly dependent upon the
observer.
3. Brandir International v. Cascade Pacific Lumber
The most recent test for conceptual separability to have been
adopted was proposed by Professor Robert Denicola,81 and was
adopted by the Second Circuit in 1987 in Brandir Int'l v. Cascade
Pacific Lumber.82 Professor Denicola suggests that the goal of such a
test is to minimize protection afforded to the components of the work
that are suggested by the functional aspect of the utilitarian article,
while at the same time protecting the aspects that are truly expres-
sive.83 To this end, the Denicola test inquires into which aspects of
the work are dictated by the functional constraints of the article, and
which aspects reflect unconstrained perspective of the artist.84 The
Brandir court clearly articulated its adoption of the Denicola test:
To state the Denicola test in terms of conceptual separability, if
design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional consid-
erations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be concep-
tually separable from the utilitarian aspects. Conversely, where the
design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer's artis-
tic judgment exercised independently of functional influences, con-
ceptual separability exists. We believe that Professor Denicola's
approach provides the best test for conceptual separability, and, ac-
cordingly, adopt it here.85
79. See appendix, figure 7.
80. See appendix, figure 9.
81. Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MiNN. L. REv. 707 (1983).
82. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987).
83. Denicola, supra note 81, at 741.
84. Id. at 742.
85. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145. It has been suggested that the Second Circuit's adoption
and/or application of the Denicola test differs somewhat from the test as described by Professor
Denicola. See Sally M. Donohue, The Copyrightability of Useful Articles: the Second Circuit's
Resistance to Conceptual Separability, 9 Touto L. RPv. 327,349,353 (1990); Shim Perlmutter,
Conceptual Similarity and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 37 J. CoPYmirr Soc'Y
U.S.A. 339, 368 (1990). See also National Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F.
Supp. 1348, 1353 (S.D. Cal. 1988). To the extent that the Second Circuit departs from Professor
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Applying this test, the court denied copyright to a bicycle rack
constructed of metal tubing and modeled after a wire sculpture of con-
tinuous undulating wire.3
6
Although the Brandir court applied the Denicola test to deny
copyright, it is this latest test that is most favorable to allowing copy-
right for typeface. As previously shown,87 typeface design is a highly
artistic endeavor. A typeface designer makes numerous artistic
choices in the design process. The constraints of the design imposed
by the utilitarian function are merely that the letters be easily readable.
Nonetheless, typefaces will differ a great deal from one another de-
pending on the artistic objectives of their designers, and still convey
the letters. Under the Denicola test, all of these variations, not being
imposed by the utilitarian aspect, are protectable. Therefore, under the
Denicola test, now adopted as law in the Second Circuit, most type-
face designs are subject to copyright.
IV. ELTRA V. RINGER
A. The Eltra v. Ringer Decision
The only reported case directly confronting the issue of copyright
for typeface is Eltra v. Ringer,88 in 1978.
In Eltra, Eltra Corporation, a manufacturer of typesetting equip-
ment, submitted an application to the Register of Copyrights to regis-
ter copyright in the design of a typeface under the 1909 Copyright
Act.8 9 Specifically, Eltra sought to register the typeface as a work of
art under the then-existing provisions of § 5(g) of the Act.90 Section
5(g) allowed registration on "[w]orks of art; models or designs for
works of art."91 The Register refused to register the copyright,9" bas-
ing its refusal on its regulation 202.10(c), which stated:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that
the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a
work of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorpo-
rates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial repre-
Denicola's articulation of the test, this comment is concerned with the test as enunciated by the
Second Circuit in Brandir.
86. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145.
87. See discussion supra part Il.C.
88. Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978).
89. Id. at 295-96.
90. Id. at 295-96.
91. "The application for registration shall specify to which of the following classes the
work in which copyright is claimed belongs: ... (g) Works of art; models or designs for works of
art." Copyright Act of 1909, § 5(g).
92. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 296.
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sentation, which can be identified separately and are capable of
existing independently as a work of art, such features will be eligi-
ble for registration.93
Eltra filed a mandamus action seeking to compel the Register to
accept the registration.94 The district court found that the typeface
design was indeed a "work of art" that would normally be subject to
copyright. 95 However, the court also found that the Copyright Office
had had a "long-standing practice" of refusing such registrations, 96
and noted that Congress had never enacted any statute to overrule this
practice.97 According to the district court, this inaction indicated an
acquiescence on the part of Congress to the administrative interpreta-
tion given to the statute by the Copyright Office.98 Given this acqui-
escence, the district court found the work not registerable and
dismissed the suit.99
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment on other grounds.'0° Specifically, the court of ap-
peals disagreed with the district court's finding that a typeface design
was a "work of art."' 0 ' Because the court of appeals found that the
design was not a "work of art," it could not be registered for
copyright. 10 2
The Eltra court rested its holding on two grounds. First, the
court held that the expression in the typeface could not be sufficiently
separated from its utilitarian aspects. 103 Second, although the 1909
Copyright Act was the operative law for the Eltra decision, the court
examined the 1976 Copyright Act's legislative history for guidance in
discerning the intent of the earlier legislation."° Each of these bases
of decision will be examined in turn.
93. 37 C.F.R. 202.10(c) (revoked, Jan. 1, 1978), noted in Eltra, 579 F.2d at 297.
94. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 296.
95. Eltra v. Ringer, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 198,201 (E.D. Va. 1976) (Eltra 1), afTd on other
grounds, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 202.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Eltra, 579 F.2d 294.
101. Id. at 289.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 298.
104. Id. at 297-98.
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B. Eltra's Application of Conceptual Separability
Foreshadowing the tests that would develop over the next fifteen
years in the Second Circuit, 10 5 the Eltra court cited the legislative his-
tory to the 1976 Copyright Act.10 6 This legislative history noted that
copyright could subsist in the design of a useful article, so long as the
expressive element could be separated from the utilitarian element,
either conceptually or physically. 107 Despite this citation, however,
the court went on to apply a test that required physical separation, and
not one that allowed for conceptual separation.
In determining whether the typeface design was a "work of art,"
the Eltra court held that the typeface was a utilitarian work. The court
was unable to separate the expressive aspects of the work from the
utilitarian aspects, and denied copyright.' In so doing, the court re-
lied on Mazer v. Stein.109
At the time of the Eltra decision, Mazer remained the preeminent
case dealing with the subsistence of copyright in works of art that
were also useful articles. At that time, the determination was very
easy. If, as in Mazer, the ostensible work of art could be physically
separated from the useful article and exist independently of it, the
work could be subject to copyright. This is precisely the distinction
that the Eltra court made:
The important fact, which must not be overlooked in analyzing Ma-
zer, is that the Supreme Court in that case was dealing with a statu-
ette, which though incorporated in a commercial article, was
capable of existing independently and had itself been registered as
a separate "work of art" under § 5(g). And it was that type of
"applied art" which the court found copyrightable under Mazer." 1 0
The Eltra court took this to be the core holding of Mazer. Fur-
thermore, it interpreted the Copyright Office regulation as being a
mere restatement of the Mazer holding, and placed the regulation on
equal stature with Mazer. Interpreting Mazer through the regulation,
the Eltra court found that "it is patent that typeface is an industrial
design in which the design cannot exist independently and separately
105. See discussion supra part RLI.B.
106. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 297.
107. Id. at 297, n.10 ("Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food
processor, television set, or any other industrial product contains some element that, physically
or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the
design would not be copyrighted under the bill.") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at
55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668) (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 298.
109. l at 296 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954)).
110. Id at 297.
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as a work of art. Because of this, typeface has never been considered
entitled to copyright under the provisions of § 5(g)."'
Thus, although the court cited language that called for tests of
both physical and conceptual separability, the court ignored the possi-
bility of conceptual separation, and relied upon what was essentially a
physical test.
C. Eltra's Use of Legislative History
The Eltra court found additional support for its holding in the
legislative history to the 1976 Copyright Act." 2 Specifically, it re-
ferred to the report of the House Committee on the Judiciary that ac-
companied the 94th Congress's H.R. 2233, the bill that eventually
became the Copyright Act of 1976.11 As the Eltra court noted, one
passage of the House Report strongly suggests that a typeface cannot
be copyrighted:
[The Committee is seeking to draw as clear a line as possible
between copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted
works of industrial design.... The Committee has considered, but
chosen to defer, the possibility of protecting the design of type-
faces.... The Committee does not regard the design of typeface, as
thus defined, to be a copyrightable 'pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work' within the meaning of this bill and the application of the
dividing line in section 101.114
The Eltra court noted this passage as confirmation that the 1909
Act did not permit copyright for typeface." 5
However, Eltra was decided under the 1909 Copyright Act, and
the legislative history that the court consulted was that of the 1976
Copyright Act. The legislative history of a subsequent Congress is a
hazardous basis for determining the legislative intent of an earlier
Congress, 116 a view acknowledged by the Eltra district court. 17 In
particular, reference to the 1976 Act and its legislative history to con-
111. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 298.
112. Id. at297-98.
113. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659.
114. Id. at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668-69.
115. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 298.
116. United States v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 1631, 1635 n.4 (1993); Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313
(1960).
117. Eltra v. Ringer, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 198, 202 (E.D. Va. 1976) (Eltra 1), aff'd on other
grounds, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978).
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strue the terms of the 1909 Act have been the subject of criticism.118
Nonetheless, in the Eltra decisions, both the court of appeals' 19 and
the district court120 used the legislative history of the 94th Congress's
Copyright Act of 1976 as the basis for interpreting the 60th Con-
gress's Copyright Act of 1909.
The Copyright Act of 1976 introduced substantial changes in
copyright law in many areas, including preemption of state law, 121
duration, 22 and determination of royalties.' 23 However, much of the
1976 Act was a mere codification of case law as it had existed prior to
the date of enactment,' 24 or a recodification of law already codified in
the 1909 Act."z
As reports of the Judiciary Committees of both the House of Rep-
resentatives 26 and the Senate 27 make clear, the 1976 Act did not pur-
port to change the requirements for a work to be subject to
copyright. 12  Because of this constancy, courts have felt free to apply
the holdings of cases in this area that were decided under the 1909
Act, or even earlier, in construing the 1976 Act.' 29 With respect to
118. See, e.g., Christopher P. Bussert, Copyright Law: A Review of the "Separability Test"
and a Proposal For New Design Protection, 10 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L 1. 59, 84-86
(1984).
119. Eltra, 579 F.2d at 297-98.
120. Eltra 1, 194 U.S.P.Q. at 202.
121. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
122. Id. §§ 302-305.
123. Id. §§ 801-810.
124. See, e.g., id. § 107; H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 66, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 61-62 (1975), reprinted in 5
Mm.vn=.u B. NMmR & DAVID NiMmER, NIMER ON CoPYRIOHT app. 4A (1988).
125. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102; H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 51, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5664; S. REP. No. 473, supra note 124, at 50.
126. The phrase "original works of authorship," which is purposely left undefined, is
intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by
the courts under the present [1909] copyright statute. This standard does not
include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no inten-
tion to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5664.
127. The phrase "original works of authorship," which is purposely left undefined, is
intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by
the courts under the present [1909] copyright statute. This standard does not
include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no inten-
tion to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them.
S. REP. No. 473, supra note 124, at 50.
128. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991).
129. The Feist case in particular is replete with examples of this principle, citing at least
three cases that had been decided under the 1909 Act: Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cited in Feist at 354; Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973), cited in Feist at 347; Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir.
1981), cited in Feist at 347. Although decided in 1981, Miller was governed by the 1909 Copy-
right Act. See Miller, 650 F.2d at 1376.
1994) PROTECTION FOR TYPEFACE DESIGNS
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, the maintenance of the status
quo between the 1909 and 1976 Acts is shown not only in both
houses' legislative history and in the treatment by the courts, but is
also implied by the statute itself.'30
The portion of the legislative history that discusses the subject
matter of copyright is discussing an area of law that was unchanged by
the 1976 Copyright Act. As such, the proper interpretation of this
portion is not as the 94th Congress's explanation of its own 1976 stat-
ute, but rather as its interpretation of the 60th Congress's Copyright
Act of 1909. Such a view may be accorded great weight by a court,1
3 1
and the Eltra court's use of the legistlative history was not illegiti-
mate. However, as shall be shown, it is questionable whether the leg-
islative history, particularly the passage in the House Report that
discusses typeface designs, is deserving of the weight that the Eltra
court gave it.
130. This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a
useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making,
distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to
such works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a
State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court
in an action brought under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 113(b).
One prominent commentator, Melville Nimmer, has gone further in the analysis of this
subsection, and has concluded that this passage, in itself, serves to incorporate the 1909 Act's
provisions for copyrightable subject matter into the 1976 Act unchanged. 1 NMRAER, supra note
124, § 2.15, at 2-179 to 2-180. As attractive as this appears, insofar as it supports this com-
ment's thesis, this position is not sound.
Section 113(b) addresses the extent of the exclusive rights as defined in § 106. It limits the
right of an owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful article to object to that article's
display in materials such as advertisements. In an attempt to show that this subsection requires
that the subject matter of copyright is unchanged by the 1976 Act, Nimmer emphasizes that
§ 113 addresses itself to the entire Copyright Act, including the subject matter provisions of
§ 102, and not merely to § 113. l id. at 2-180.
However, the conclusion that nothing in the Act limits the rights conferred under § 106 does
not, by itself, indicate that the types of works for which those rights are conferred is unchanged.
Nimmer relies on the fact that a design of an automobile is used by the House Report as a
hypothetical to illustrate both limitations. 1 id. at 2-179 (referring to H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra
note 2, at 55, 105, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668, 5720). However, it is not clear that
this consistency in two examples separated by 50 pages is sufficient to link the two as strongly as
Nimmer does.
Nevertheless, § 113(b) remains as an unambiguous indication in the text of the statute of the
1976 Congress's intent to maintain the status quo in certain areas of copyright law. As such, it
supports the unambiguous indications in both houses' legislative histories that the subject matter
provisions were unchanged as well.
131. See, e.g., Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 598 (1980)
('[W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the
enacting one ... such views are entitled to significant weight.").
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D. The Eltra Legacy
Eltra was decided on two major bases: a test of physical separa-
bility and the strength of a recent legislative history. However, each
of these bases has sufficiently eroded so that Eltra does not serve as a
compelling precedent.
1. Conceptual Separability
As noted, 132 Eltra applied what was essentially a test for physical
separation, and not a test for conceptual separation as is currently ap-
plied. In fairness to the Eltra court, this was an accurate reflection of
copyright jurisprudence as it existed at the time of the decision.1 33 At
that time, Mazer was the leading case in copyright for useful articles.
The few cases that dealt with copyright of useful articles had either
depended upon physical separability,134 or were cases where the ex-
pression in the article was readily perceived as an adornment on a
physical object for the purposes of enhancing the object's appear-
ance.1 35 Cases in which the conceptual separation of an article's ex-
pression and usefulness was called into play had not yet been
decided. 136
It is unfortunate that Eltra was decided before the jurisprudence
of conceptual separability had evolved to its present state. In the years
since the Eltra decision, the question of conceptual separation has
been studied more closely by the courts, and the tests discussed
1 37
have risen to meet the challenges. It is doubtful that a court faced with
such a decision today would apply as simplistic a test as that used in
Eltra. With the benefit of hindsight and the development of tests like
the Denicola-Brandir test, a court today can properly discern the ex-
pressive elements of a typeface and allow copyright to subsist.
132. See discussion supra part IV.A.
133. See, e.g., Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979).
134. E.g., Mazer, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
135. See, e.g., Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 492 F.2d 1281, 1284 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974) (model airplane kit held copyrightable);
E.I.Horsman & Aetna Doll Co. v. Kaufman, 286 F. 372 (2d Cir. 1922), cert denied, 261 U.S. 615
(1923) (doll's head held copyrightable); Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., Inc., 259 F. Supp.
733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (pencil sharpener in the shape of an antique telephone held copyrightable);
Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (child's hobby horse
held copyrightable).
136. "Since Mazer v. Stein was decided before the principle of 'conceptual separability' was
explicitly identified as a criterion of copyrightability of the design of a useful article, it is not
surprising that the Court's opinion does not illuminate the distinction between 'physical' and
'conceptual' separability." Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 421 n.2 (Newman, J., dissenting).
137. See discussion supra part III.B.
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2. Legislative History
While Eltra's use of the House Report was legitimate, the viabil-
ity of using the passage discussing typeface 38 as if it were an unmis-
takable expression of congressional intent is questionable.
Generally, legislative history is considered a valid aid in deter-
mining the intent of an ambiguous statute.' 39 When there is no doubt
as to the meaning of the statute, the statute will be construed as writ-
ten, without resort to the legislative history."4 Given this rule, we
must first determine if the statute, as written, is ambiguous.
Section 102, while not defining the term "works of authorship,"
provides a list of categories of works that are included within the
scope of that term.' 4 ' One of these categories is that of "pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works."' 4 2 This category includes "works of
fine, graphic, and applied art.""' As noted above, a typeface is
clearly a work of graphic art and/or applied art.'"
However, the statute places limitations on such works if they are
designs for useful articles:
[s]uch works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar
as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are con-
cerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section,
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if,
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article. 145
Thus, there are two other important questions that must be an-
swered in order to recognize copyright. First, is a typeface a design
for a "useful article?" Second, if it is such a design, can the pictorial,
138. See discussion supra part IV.C.
139. E.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456,463 (1967). Note, however that
some jurists, most notably United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, are particularly
suspicious of the use of legislative history, and regard only the text of the statute as authoritative.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-638 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United
States v. R.L.C., 112 S.Ct 1329, 1340 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 449 (1936).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
142. Id. § 102(a)(5).
143. Id. § 101 ("'Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' include two-dimensional and
three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproduc-
tions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural
plans.").
144. See supra notes 16-22, 40-48 and accompanying text.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
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graphic, or sculptural features of the typeface be identified separately
from and exist independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article?
The threshold question that must be answered here is, "Is a type-
face design a design of a useful article?" The definition in § 101
states in pertinent part, "A 'useful article' is an article having an in-
trinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance
of the article or to convey information."' 46
In the case of a typeface design, the useful article is the font in
which the typeface will eventually be embodied. It is without ques-
tion that a font is a useful article. It has a utilitarian function, to pro-
duce textual output, whether on paper, a computer screen, or other
media. However, it is misleading to consider a typeface a design for a
useful article; rather, the font is an article whose purpose is to embody
the typeface design.
Fonts of a given type are generally identical except for the data
that describes the typeface that they encode. Despite the clear differ-
ences between the Times' 47 and Helvetica 141 typefaces, for example, a
bitmapped font that embodies one is identical to a bitmapped font that
embodies the other, except for the data that describes the typeface em-
bodied. A typeface design is capable of being embodied in any
number of fonts that may use very different methods of reproducing
the typeface. In this respect, the typeface design is no more a design
for a font than a photograph taken for a book cover is a design for a
book cover. In both cases, the putative "useful article," whether it is
the font or the book cover, is little more than the medium for the
representation of the work of authorship. One would never consider a
photograph a "design for a useful article," and thereby attempt to limit
its copyright, merely because it was intended to be placed on a book
cover. 149 In the same way, to consider a typeface design as nothing
more than a design for a font, rather than recognizing that a font is
nothing more than the medium that carries a typeface, is akin to saying
that a tail is something that wags a dog.
The conclusion is that a typeface is not a design for a useful arti-
cle. As such, the question of whether its expressive element may be
separated from the utilitarian element of an article for which it is a
design is moot. Without further examination, we may conclude that
146. Id. § 101 (definition of "useful article").
147. See appendix, figure 1.
148. See appendix, figure 5.
149. Of course, the photograph image is conceptually separable from the book cover, and
hence is not so limited. Nevertheless, for the purpose of distinguishing a design for a useful
article from a design embodied in a useful article, the comparison is apt.
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the typeface is a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, and subject to
copyright.
However, what if, arguendo, a typeface is considered a design for
a useful article? In that case, the predicate of the § 101 definition
attaches, and the typeface's copyright extends only so far as the picto-
rial, graphic, or sculptural features of the typeface can be identified
separately from and are capable of existing independently of, the utili-
tarian aspects of the article.15 This breaks down into two questions:
1) can the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of the typeface be
identified separately from the utilitarian aspects of the font, and 2) are
the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of the typeface capable of
existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the font?
Again, the answer to each of these questions is in the affirmative.
First, as the users of typeface make clear, the pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features, that is, the features that give the typeface its per-
sonality, can be identified separately from the utilitarian aspects of the
font. 5 ' Secondly, as noted above,' 52 with the benefit of the Denicola-
Brandir test and the other tests developed for conceptual separability,
it is possible to separate a typeface's expressive aspects from the
purely utilitarian aspects of the font.
A very strong argument may be made, then, that the copyright
statute is not ambiguous with respect to typeface, and that a reference
to a legislative history is not appropriate on that ground.
However, there is an alternate ground upon which to review the
legislative history. In addition to using legislative history to construe
an ambiguous statute, a court may use it as a means of verifying that
its own interpretation of the statute is correct.'53 If the history con-
tains an expressed legislative intention contrary to the statutory lan-
guage, the presumption that the Congressional intent is properly
reflected in the statutory language is questionable.' 5 4 It must be con-
ceded that, if a court contemplated granting a copyright in a typeface,
it could justifiably look to legislative history to see if anything in the
legislative history indicated an intent contrary to the meaning of the
150. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "useful article").
151. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
152. See discussion supra part III.B.3.
153. [IThe plain language of this statute appears to settle the question before us.
Therefore, we look to the legislative history to determine only whether there is
"clearly expressed legislative intention" contrary to that language, which would
require us to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent
through the language it chooses.
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987).
154. Id.
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statute and thereby consider the same damaging passage relied upon
by the Eltra court.
Now, however, we examine the weight that should be accorded
this passage. There are several considerations that suggest that little
reliance should be placed upon it.
First, as noted earlier, the proper construction of this passage is as
the 94th Congress's interpretation of the 1909 statute enacted by the
60th Congress, 5 ' or in Professor Nimmer's words, "a suggested inter-
pretation of the 1909 Act rather than as a statutory command to the
courts."'156 There is no assurance that the 94th Congress's views accu-
rately reflect those of the 60th Congress. As Nimmer points out, as an
expression of the 94th Congress's interpretation of the 60th Con-
gress's legislation, the House Report's statement on typeface design is
to be given due weight, but is not binding upon the court.1 57
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the view expressed in the
House Report is only in the House Report. Substantial portions of the
House and Senate Reports are word-for-word identical."5 ' However,
there is no passage in the Senate Report that is in any way similar to
the passage in the House Report that discussed typeface. 159 Therefore,
as far as the Senate is concerned, the statutory text speaks for itself,
and that text contains no provision that excludes typeface. 160
The passage in the House Report must be understood in the con-
text of its time.' In 1976, typeface designs were the province of
professional printers; the "desktop publishing" industry did not yet ex-
155. See discussion supra part IV.C.
156. 1 NrwnimR, supra note 124, § 2.15, at 2-180.
157. 1 id § 2.15, at 2-178.10.
158. Compare e.g., notes 126 and 127, supra.
159. S. REP. No. 473, supra note 124.
160. Nimmer argues that the House Report itself is ambiguous on the issue. 1 NIMMER,
supra note 124, § 2.15, at 2-178.7. He bases this on the fact that the Report characterizes as
unanswered the question "should typeface designs be given the protections of the title?" 1 id. at
2-178.7 n.4. However, when read in context, it is clear that by the phrase "the title," the House
Report is referring not to Title 17 (Copyright) of the United States Code, as one might think, but
rather is referring to Title II of S. 22, the Senate version of the bill that ultimately became the
Copyright Act of 1976. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 50, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5663.
Title II contained the Design Protection Act of 1975, which, had it been enacted, would
have added provisions to Title 17 for the protection of ornamental designs of useful articles. S.
REP. No. 473, supra note 124, at 39-47. Title II was not present in the House version of the bill,
and was not enacted. H.R. CorN. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 82 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810, 5823. Thus, the House Report is not asserting that Title 17, as en-
acted, leaves the question of protection open, but rather that Title II, had it been enacted, would
have left the question open.
161. See A Pocket History of Font Technology, Tm SEYBOLD REoRT ON Dascrop Pun.
LisHwG (Seybold Publications, Inc., Media, Pa.), Oct. 16, 1989, at 13-18.
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ist. Because of the relatively small number of potential licensees of a
given typeface, the problem of typeface copying was one that was
capable of being handled by contract.' 62 Copyright, while perhaps
helpful, was not a necessity.
In contrast, the 1980s brought forth the personal computer and
inexpensive printing equipment, creating the new industry of "desktop
publishing" and a corresponding increase in the demand for new and
different typeface designs. Today, computer programs exist that make
it easy for users to create new fonts that copy existing typeface
designs.' 63
The circumstances existing at the time the House Report was
written are substantially different from today's. The House Report is
simply not applicable to the issue of copyright of typeface designs
today.
3. Summary
In summary, both of the legs on which the Eltra decision stands
are weak. Even if legislative history is referenced, the passage dis-
cussing typeface is a poor basis from which to infer congressional
intent. The passage represents only the view of one committee of a
single house of Congress, the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives, and does not reflect the equally important views of
the Senate, which is silent on the issue. It purports to divine the intent
of a Congress sitting 67 years earlier. When combined with the
courts' advances in determination of conceptual separability, the other
linchpin of the Eltra decision, it is clear that the precedental value of
that decision is very limited. Considering nearly twenty years of ad-
vances in both law and technology, a court sitting to decide the issue
of typeface copyright today should accord Eltra little or no weight. A
court deciding the issue of typeface copyright today should apply the
modem tests of conceptual similarity, and to the extent that those tests
reflect a work of authorship in the typeface, recognize its copyright.
162. See ALEXANDER LAWSON, ANATOMY OF A TYPEFACE 126-28 (1990). See also Seybold
Spats Brace Industry For Mighty Windows Font War, Tsm HARD COPY OBSER ER (Lyra,
Newton Highlands, Mass.), Mar. 1992, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Seybold Spats].
163. Examples of such programs include Fontographer, a product of Altsys Corp., Richard-
son, Texas, and FontChameleon, FontFiddler, FontHopper and FontMonger, products of Ares
Software Corp., Foster City, California.
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E. The Copyright Office Regulation and the Chevron
Doctrine
Unfortunately, there is a significant obstacle to a judicial recogni-
tion of copyright in typeface. In February 1992, the Copyright Office
codified the Eltra holding as Copyright Office regulation 202.1(e):
"[The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and
applications for registration of such works will not be entertained:]
typeface as typeface."'"
Although registration is generally a condition precedent for
bringing a suit for copyright infringement,16 a claimant of copyright
may bring suit for infringement if the application for registration has
been submitted to and refused by the Copyright Office.1 66 However,
registration is highly desirable, because it provides prima facie evi-
dence of validity of the copyright and of the facts presented on the
certificate (e.g., the identity of the author of the work), 167 and under
certain conditions, qualifies the copyright holder for attorney's fees
and statutory damages. 168 Consequently, the value of an unregistered
copyright is significantly less than that of a registered copyright.
However, in light of the new regulation, it is highly unlikely that
a court will recognize a typeface copyright and order the Copyright
Office to register it. Under the doctrine enunciated in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C.,169 if a statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to a specific issue, the construction given to that statute by an
agency responsible for the administration of the statute will be applied
as long as the agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable.1 70 It
is not necessary for the court reviewing the regulation to conclude that
the agency's construction is the only one possible.' 7 ' Rather, such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are ar-
164. 57 Fed. Reg. 6201 (1992), codified at 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (1992). Technically, this
regulation restricts what may be registered, and is not a legally binding statement of what may be
copyrighted. A plaintiff may bring a claim of copyright infringement even if the Copyright
Office has refused to register the work on the ground that the work is not subject to copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 411(a). However, the Copyright Office's decision whether to register the work is
dependent upon its determination of whether the work is subject to copyright. 17 U.S.C.
§ 410(a)-(b). As a practical matter, the issues of whether a work is subject to copyright and
whether the Copyright Office will register the work amount to the same question of law.
165. 17 U.S.C. § 411.
166. Id.
167. Id. § 410(c).
168. Id. § 412.
169. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
170. Id. at 843.
171. Id. n.l1.
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bitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute or otherwise
violate the law.172
The Copyright Office, through its director, the Register of Copy-
rights,' 73 is authorized to establish regulations for administration of its
functions and duties.' 74 These functions and duties include the exami-
nation and determination of whether a particular work submitted for
registration of copyright constitutes copyrightable subject matter.' 75
The Chevron doctrine is therefore applicable to the Copyright Of-
172. Id. at 844.
173. See 17 U.S.C. § 701(a).
174. 17 U.S.C. § 702.
175. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a). Some cracks may be appearing in the applicability of the Chevron
doctrine to Copyright Office regulations that govern standards of copyright. Recently, the prem-
ise that the Copyright Office has the authority to set standards that a work must meet in order to
be copyrighted has been called into question. In reporting the Copyright Reform Act of 1993,
H.R. 897, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., the House Judiciary Committee criticized "attempts by the
Copyright Office to shape the scope of copyright.. ." H.R. REP. No. 388, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1993). The Committee noted:
The Committee considers this gatekeeper role to exceed the Office's limited ex-
amination function. The function of the examination process is not to influence
directly or indirectly the scope of copyright that a court might accord, nor to weed
out works, which though copyrightable in their entirety, may, in the Office's opin-
ion, may [sic) be the subject of frivolous or overreaching infringement claims.
The Office's function is to examine the material deposited for registration and to
evaluate, using the standards for copyrightability developed in the courts, whether
the material meets those standards. If the material meets those standards, registra-
tion is required.
Id. at 11. The Committee pointed to the February 1992 regulation proscribing the registration of
typeface as an example of the Copyright Office exceeding its authority. Id. at 11, n.20.
The Committee drives home its point:
Notwithstanding Section 410 of title 17, United States Code, it is the courts which
have been vested by Congress with the ultimate determination of copyrightability,
not the Copyright Office. In determining whether to register a claim to copyright,
the Copyright Office should be guided by court decisions on what constitutes an
original work of authorship.
Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the proposed Copyright Reform Act includes an amendment that expressly
sets forth the Copyright Office's limited scope of review. Under the amendment, registration
may be refused only if "the Register of Copyrights determines, in accordance with this title
[Title 17, United States Code], that there is no reasonable possibility that a court would hold the
work ... to be copyrightable subject matter." H.R. 897, supra, § 5. As the Committee notes in
the House Report, "[t]he Copyright Office is thus directed to defer to the courts, not vice versa."
H.R. Rep. No. 388 at 18.
If a court accepts the argument that regulation 202.1(e) was promulgated in excess of the
authority of the Copyright Office, this would significantly undermine the applicability of the
Chevron doctrine, and a challenge may be successful. This argument is likely to be even more
persuasive if the Copyright Reform Act is enacted.
The Act passed the House of Representatives on November 20, 1993, 139 CoNa. REc.
H10308, H10312 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) and was referred to the Senate. 139 CONG. Rae.
S16717 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993). At the time of this writing, the bill was under consideration
by the Senate Judiciary Committee. 139 CONG. Rac. S17054 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1993).
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fice. 176 As such, 202.1(e) has controlling weight over the issue of
whether the Copyright Office may be ordered to register a copyright in
typeface.
By terms of the Copyright Act of 1976,177 the Register of Copy-
rights' refusal to register may be appealed under the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946.178 However, in view of the Chevron doctrine,
assuming a consistent enforcement of regulation 202.1(e) in a way that
is not arbitrary or capricious, 179 the regulation will be upheld and the
Office will not be ordered to register a copyright in typeface design.
As a result, the Copyright Office regulation has the practical effect of
elevating a relatively obscure 4th Circuit decision, which would not
ordinarily bind the courts of any other circuit, to an authority of nearly
statutory level, binding even the U.S. Supreme Court.
V. STATUTORY COPYRIGHT FOR TYPEFACE: A PROPOSED
ArmNDMENT TO THE COPYRIGHT STATUTE
Due to regulation 202.1(e) and the Chevron doctrine, a judicial
decision that recognizes copyright in a typeface or orders its registra-
tion is highly unlikely. For that reason, Congress should amend the
current Copyright Act to expressly permit copyright for the design of
typefaces. 180
176. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman,
J., concurring) (Chevron applies to categorical distinctions by Copyright Office, but not to indi-
vidual office actions).
177. Id. § 701(d). The availability of a remedy via the Administrative Procedures Act re-
moved the remedy of mandamus that was the subject of Eltra. Nova Stylings, Inc. v. Ladd, 695
F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1983).
178. Act of June 11, 1946, as amended by ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988)).
179. The reviewing court shall ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statu-
tory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557
of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by
statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court
5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
180. While the current view is that a typeface cannot be copyrighted, this does not mean
that commercially available computer fonts are not copyrightable. That question depends on the
nature of the font. If a font does no more than simply depict the unprotected typeface, then the
font is not protected. However, if the font is made up of a series of instructions that instruct a
1994] PROTECTION FOR TYPEFACE DESIGNS
A. Treatment in Other Jurisdictions
The idea of affording copyright protection to a typeface is not a
novel or radical one. Several other nations have recognized the ex-
pressive characteristics of typeface and afford it copyright or similar
protection. England recognized copyright in typeface design as long
ago as 1916.181 The current United Kingdom copyright statute,18 2
which covers England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland,18 3 ex-
pressly recognizes typeface as a protected artistic work.18 4  Canada
protects typeface through its Industrial Design Act, which provides
copyright-like protection for "features of shape, configuration, pattern
or ornament and any combination of those features that, in a finished
computer or printer to form the shapes of the letters, or to perform such functions as scaling,
italicizing, or emboldening the typeface, then the font may be copyrighted as a literary work;
specifically, a computer program. Registrability of Computer Programs That Generate Type-
faces, 57 Fed. Reg. 6201 (1992). Examples of fonts meeting this criteria include fonts using
Microsoft Corp.'s TrueType specification or using Adobe Systems Inc.'s PostScript language.
See MIcRosoFr CoRPORATIoN, TRuETYPE FONT Fr.es (1992); ADOBE SYSTEMS INC., PosT-
Sciupr LANGUAGE TUToRiAL AND COOKBOOK 197-225 (1985). See also Current Developments:
Proprietary Rights, THm CoMPurER LAWYER, Feb. 1990, at 26 (reporting Adobe Corporation's
successful registration of copyright in a font program). This has the ironic effect of turning
copyright on its head: a font program in object code format (in which format its expression as a
literary work cannot be perceived), whose sole value is the functional aspect of reproducing the
shapes of letters, is protected by copyright, while the expressive aspect of the font, the typeface
encoded into it, is not.
An interesting question is whether the copyright on such a font may be used to protect the
putatively unprotectable data that make up the typeface design. A number of font vendors are
testing this. Adobe Systems Inc., Bitstream, Inc., FontShop Canada Ltd., Q.E.D. Publishing Co.,
and Emigre Graphics have filed suit in the District of Massachusetts against SWFTE Interna-
tional Ltd., alleging copyright infringement on the basis of SWFTE's business practices in pro-
ducing its fonts. Adobe Systems, Inc., et. al, v. SWFrE Int'l Ltd., No. 93-11068H (D. Mass.
filed May 17, 1993). SWFTE's practice was to load copyrighted fonts into a commercial font
editor program, and extract the data comprising the typeface designs, from which it then pro-
duced its own fonts having identical typeface designs. The case remains pending as this com-
ment goes to press. See William M. Bulkeley, Font War: That's My Type, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
1993, at BI.
181. Stephenson, Blake and Co. v. Grant, Legros & Co., 115 L.T.R. 666, 61 Sol. J. 55
(1916), reprinted in EJ. MAcGILIVRAy, CoPYMGHT CASES 1911-1916 326-329 (1969), aff'd
116 L.T.R. 268 (1917), noted in 13 Eng. and Empire DIoESr 68, 68-69. The court recognized
that the typeface design was subject to copyright under the then-current Copyright Act of 1911,
An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Law Relating to Copyright, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 46
(Eng.). However, the plaintiff's victory was hollow. The court held that the copyright protected
only the design in its entirety, with all the letters in their particular order. The defendant's
embodiment of them into a font of his own, as opposed to a reproduction of the design with the
letters in the same order, was held not to infringe. MACGLrvRAY, supra at 327-28.
182. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48 (Eng.).
183. William R. Cornish, United Kingdom, in I INTERNATIONAL COPYIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE § 1[1], at U.K.-7 (Melville B. Nimmer & Paul Edward Geller eds., 1992).
184. While the Act does not expressly list typeface designs in its list of protected works,
§ 54 expressly refers to a typeface as a copyrighted work. See Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, supra note 182, §§ 1, 54.
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article, appeal to and are judged solely by the eye."'1 5 Italy also per-
mits protection of typefaces in its design protection legislation,186 as
does Germany.' 87 In 1973, a treaty allowing for the international pro-
tection of typeface design was adopted at Vienna. 188 France, Ger-
many, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
San Marino, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia signed
the agreement.18
9
In the United States, the most recent effort to protect typeface
designs is a separate set of legislation protecting industrial designs.
190
Unfortunately, because such legislation encompasses not only type-
face designs, but any industrial designs, its passage has been impeded
by fears that it would afford monopolistic advantages to manufacturers
of utilitarian objects that would be the subject of the bill.' 91 A design
protection bill was proposed by the Senate as Title II to the Copyright
Act of 1976,192 but this bill was deleted by the House Judiciary Com-
mittee. 193 Ironically, one of the reasons stated to justify the bill's de-
letion was its lack of a provision expressly extending protection to
typeface design.' 94 Repeated attempts to enact design protection have
uniformly met with failure.'
95
185. Industrial Design Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-9, § 2 (1985), amended by ch. 15, 1988 S.C., § 18
(1988) (Can.).
186. Italian Design Law of 1940, noted in J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic
and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976,
1983 DUKE LJ. 1143, 1243 n.525 (1983).
187. Act Concerning Copyright In Designs, translated in 6 IIC SrUDIES: STUDIES IN INDUS-
TRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW, GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, COPYRIGTr AND ANTI.
TRUST LAWS 76-79 (Friedrich-KarI Beier, Gerhard Schricker & Eugen Ulmer, eds., 1983).
188. Vienna Agreement for the Protection of Type Faces and Their International Deposit,
reprinted in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGAN1ZATION (WIPO), RECORDS OF THE VIENNA
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON Tim PROTECTION OF TYPE FACES 1973 (1980) (hereinafter Vienna
Agreement). See also Andr6 Frangon, The Vienna Agreement for the Protection of Type Faces
and their International Deposit, COPYRIGHT, May, 1976, at 129.
189. While the treaty was signed by eleven states, it will not go into effect until at least five
of the signatories have ratified or acceded to it. Vienna Agreement, supra note 188, art. 35. At
the time of this writing, the necessary ratifications have not yet occurred. Paul Edward Geller,
International Copyright: An Introduction, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 183, § 4[l][c][i], n.392.1.
190. See, e.g., Introduction of the Design Innovation and Technology Act of 1991, 137
CONG. REc. H2249-50 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1992); Introduction of Industrial Design Protection
Act, 135 CONG. REc. E337 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1989).
191. 138 CONG. RFc. E1223-24 (daily ed. May 4, 1992) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski).
192. S. REP. No. 473, supra note 124, at 39-42.
193. H.R. CoNi'. REP. No. 1733, supra note 160, at 82, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5823.
194. "The [House Judiciary] Committee chose to delete Title I in part because ... Title II
left unanswered [the question] should typeface designs be given the protections of the title?"
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 50, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5863.
195. Denicola, supra note 81, at 707 n.606.
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B. The Proposed Legislation
Because of the historic tendency of design protection legislation
to fail and the limitations inherent in a judicially-recognized copyright
for typeface, the method of protection that makes the most sense is an
amendment to existing copyright law, such that the statute expressly
permits typeface to be copyrighted. The following amendments are
suggested; text being added is indicated by italics.
First, the definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works"' 6 should be modified to expressly include typeface designs:
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, pho-
tographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, dia-
grams, models, typeface designs, and technical drawings, including
architectural plans.
Second, a definition of "typeface design" should be added to the
list of definitions' 97 in the Copyright Act. The following definition is
proposed, to be added after the definition of "transmit":
A "typeface design" consists of a set of letters, numbers, or other
symbolic characters, whose forms are related by repeating design
elements consistently applied in a notational system. 198
Finally, in order to avoid certain undesirable consequences of
protecting typeface design with copyright, 99 the following subsection
Some have suggested that the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-Dec. 17,
1993, Canada-Mexico-United States, 32 1.L.M. 605, (hereinafter "NAFTA") requires its signato-
ries to enact design protection legislation. NAFrA Article 1713 § 1 provides:
Each Party shall provide for the protection of independently created industrial
designs that are new or original. A party may provide that:
(a) designs are not new or original if they do not significantly differ from
known designs or combinations of known design features; and
(b) such protection shall not extend to designs dictated essentially by techni-
cal or functional considerations.
NAFTA, Article 1713, § 1.
Despite this provision, the United States' implementation of NAFTA, perhaps viewing ex-
isting design patent provisions as satisfying the United States obligations under Article 1713,
does not make provisions for additional design protection. See the North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, §§ 331-335, 107 Stat. 2057, 2113-2116
(1993). The requirements for novelty and nonobviousness imposed upon design patents by the
patent statute, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 171, appear to be permissible restrictions under NAFTA
Article 1713 § l(a), supra.
196. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
197. Id.
198. This is the definition used in the most recent failed design protection bill. H.R. 1790,
supra note 2, § 1001(b)(4).
199. See infra parts V.C.4 and V.C.6.
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is proposed to be added to § 113, "Scope of exclusive rights in picto-
rial, graphic, and sculptural works," following subsection (d):
(e) In the case of a typeface design, it is not an infringement of
copyright to depict an article printed with the typeface in any liter-
ary, pictorial, graphic, or audiovisual work, or to use the typeface
in the ordinary course of typing, composing text, typesetting, or
printing.
C. Potential Objections to Extending Copyright to Typeface
A number of arguments against typeface copyright have been put
forth. These fears will be examined and put to rest.
1. Design Patent
One objection to allowing copyright for typeface is that protec-
tion for typeface already exists in the form of design patent law, mak-
ing further protection unnecessary.
Under U.S. patent law, one may obtain a design patent for new,
original ornamental designs for articles of manufacture. 2° Typeface
is patentable under this provision, and several patents for typeface de-
sign have been issued.20 1 Because U.S. intellectual property law al-
ready provides for protection for typeface design, it is legitimate to
question if additional protection in the form of copyright is justified.
However design patent provides insufficient protection for type-
face, for three reasons: the stringent requirements of novelty and non-
obviousness, the excessive protection afforded by patent protection,
and the short duration of patent protection.
First, the requirements for a design patent are much higher than
for a copyright. In order for a design to be patented, it must meet the
same requirements as an invention that is the subject of a utility pat-
ent.2"a A typeface must be novel20 3 and non-obvious 2 4 to qualify for
a design patent. Unlike a work being copyrighted, it is not enough
that the design be original to its author.
A design is considered novel only if: 1) prior to the invention of
the design, the design has not been known or used by others in the
United States or described in a printed publication in any country,205
200. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
201. E.g., Typeface Design, U.S. Des. Patent No. 289,773, Bigelow, et al., inventors (May
12, 1987).
202. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
203. Id. § 102.
204. Id. § 103.
205. Id. § 102(a).
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and 2) in the year prior to the date of the patent application, the design
was not described in any printed publication in any nation and was not
in public use or on sale in the United States.2 °6 At the very least, this
requires an extensive and expensive search by a patent applicant, an
obstacle not present in copyright.
Even more troublesome than the novelty requirement is the re-
quirement of non-obviousness. A design is considered nonobvious if
the differences between the design and previously publicly available
designs are such that the design would have been obvious at the time
of "invention" to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art.207
The issue of nonobviousness as applied to design patents is a difficult
one, a fact that has been recognized by one Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks. 20 8 Applied to typeface design, this means that even
a novel and original typeface design is not protectable if another type-
face designer could have designed the same typeface. Such a standard
is highly subjective, and not particularly useful.
Beyond the difficulties in assessing novelty and nonobviousness
of a typeface design, it is unclear exactly why those requirements
should be present for the protection of one species of works of author-
ship when they are not present for other works under copyright law.
A second inadequacy with design patent as a method of protect-
ing typeface is that, compared to copyright, it affords too much protec-
tion. A copyright in a pictorial work includes the right to reproduce
the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work, to distribute the copyrighted work, and to display
the copyrighted work publicly. 2° An infringement occurs when one
of these four exclusive rights is violated.210 However, if a similar or
identical work is created independently of an earlier copyrighted
work, no infringement occurs."1' For there to be infringement, the
second work must be in some way copied or derived from the first
work. In contrast, a design patent protects the design as described and
claimed in the patent, not merely the particular work as originated by
the author. A patent confers upon the patentee the right to exclude
206. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
207. Id. § 103.
208. "[Ihe concept of unobviousness is not well suited to ornamental designs. We believe
a registration system ... would serve industry better at lower cost." Then-Commissioner of
Patent and Trademarks Gerald Mossinghoff, Address at the American Bar Ass'n Patent, Trade-
mark, and Copyright Section (Aug. 8, 1981), noted in In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1219
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., concurring).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
210. Id. § 501.
211. Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1976).
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others from making, using, or selling the patented design.212 Any per-
son who makes, uses, or sells a patented design without authority in-
fringes the patent;213 independent creation is not a defense.21 4 A
design patent prevents a similar typeface from being independently
created by another designer, even if the design is entirely original to
that designer.
This means that the protection afforded by a patent is far greater
than that afforded by copyright. A typeface patentee is not only pro-
tected against copying; the patentee is also granted a monopoly over
the typeface, capable of being asserted against anyone using the de-
sign, even if the design independently originates with the second
author.
A third difficulty with design patent as a protection for typeface
is the relatively short duration of the term. A design patent affords
protection for only 14 years.2 5 This short duration is justifiable based
upon monopoly power conferred by the patent, as distinguished from
the relatively weaker protection from copying that is conferred by
copyright. However, it still forces works of authorship into the public
domain far earlier than would occur if the work were covered by
copyright. This does not reflect the interests that justify a longer term
of protection for copyrighted works. The term of protection offered
by copyright and design patent were once much closer than they are
today. In 1870, for example, the duration of a design patent ranged
from three and a half years to 14 years, at the election of the paten-
tee.216 At that same time, copyright endured for 28 years, renewable
for 14 additional years.217 In the years since then, maximum design
patent protection has remained fixed at 14 years.21 Copyright protec-
tion, on the other hand, has steadily lengthened, and today generally
endures for a term of the life of the author and fifty years after the
author's death.219 The reasons for this increase include the objective
of ensuring that a work does not fall into public domain within its
author's lifetime and the recognition of the extended commercial life
that has been afforded to copyrighted works as a result of the tremen-
dous growth in communications media.220 These reasons are as appli-
212. 35 U.S.C. § 271.
213. Id. § 271(a).
214. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 477-78 (1974).
215. 35 U.S.C. § 173.
216. Patent and Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 73, 16 Stat. 209.
217. Id. §§ 87-88.
218. 35 U.S.C. § 173.
219. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). In the case of works made for hire, duration is until the earlier of
75 years from first publication or 100 years from creation. Id. § 302(c).
220. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2, at 134, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5750.
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cable to the artistry in a typeface design as to that in any other artistic
work. 221
2. Difficulty in Assessing Similarity
A second objection to allowing copyright protection for typeface
is that typefaces are very similar in appearance to one another, and
that distinguishing among them is so difficult that effective enforce-
ment of a typeface copyright cannot be obtained. This objection does
not withstand scrutiny.
A prima facie showing of copyright infringement requires that
the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant copied material from the
copyrighted work and that the copying constituted improper appropri-
ation of protected expression.22 Copying may be shown by circum-
stantial evidence by demonstrating that the defendant had access to the
copyrighted work and that the two works are so similar that the later
work must have been based on the first.21 The objection is that be-
cause of the innate similarities inherent in a typeface, it would be
nearly impossible to determine whether the expression in the defend-
ant's typeface was derived from the expression in the plaintiff's type-
face.224 There are a number of answers to this objection.
First, a review of copyright cases that examine typeface shows
that this fear is not justified. In Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus-
tries, Inc.,2' s a poster advertising the film Moscow On The Hudson
was found to be similar to the plaintiff's illustration for the cover of
The New Yorker magazine.226 As one element supporting the finding
of infringement, the court found that the typeface used for the words
"Moscow On The Hudson" was sufficiently similar to that used on the
The New Yorker cover to reinforce the argument that defendants had
copied the magazine illustration.227
221. Another reason for the lengthy term of copyright put forth by the 94th Congress was
the perceived need for uniformity with other nations, a prerequisite to the United States' eventual
adherence to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 2 at 135, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5751. This factor is not applicable to the term afforded to copyright in type-
faces; the leading international agreement with respect to typeface protection requires a mini-
mum term of 15 years. Vienna Agreement, supra note 188, art. 9.
222. Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
223. Id. at 468.
224. 15 OMNaMUs CoPYMorHT REvisION LaoISLArE HIsToRy 1194, 1196 (1977) (testi-
mony of Irwin Karp, Nov. 6, 1974).
225. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 711 n.1.
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In Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., the court, in denying defendant's
motion for summary judgment, noted similarities of size, shape, color
and typeface in a greeting card as one characteristic justifying preser-
vation of the question of substantial similarity for the jury.228
Furthermore, while this comment is addressed to typeface as ap-
plied to copyright, it is worth noting that judicial determinations of
similarity of typeface may be found in several other cases, particularly
trademark cases, without any problems distinguishing the various de-
signs.229 Such determinations have not been confined to intellectual
property cases.230
Of course, there may be cases where the differences are difficult
for a lay finder of fact to determine. However, expert testimony is
admissible in cases where specialized knowledge assists the trier of
fact to determine a fact in issue.231 Expert testimony can and has been
used to determine similarity of works in copyright cases.2 32
In addition, the patronizing view that a jury must necessarily be
unable to comprehend the differences among typefaces is in direct
conflict with the fact that the general public's demand for the typeface
is driven by exactly these differences. As one writer and designer has
noted,
What I keep wondering is if typefaces are all that hard to tell
apart, if they all look the same to the general public, why do mem-
bers of the public buy any new ones? In theory, if they all look the
same, users should be content with the half dozen that come with
their computers. If, on the other hand, they want more because
they can tell them apart, there's no reason not to protect the designs
228. Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., No. 82-C2668, 1986 WL 4718 at *4 (N.D. Ill., Apr. 14,
1986).
229. See, e.g., Venetianaire Corp. of America v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1081
(2d Cir. 1970) (noting similarity of spelling and typeface of words "hygienic" and "hygient" in
finding trademark infringement); Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1431
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147 (1986) (noting similarity of typefaces in logos of
retail stores).
230. See Matter of Gateway Press, Inc., No. 90-2, 1990 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 1319, at
513 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 21, 1990) (ruling of Comptroller General, noting "significant differences"
between Eras Ultra typeface as required by government contract and Avant Garde Bold typeface
furnished by bidder).
231. FED. R. EvID. 702.
232. See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting testimony of music
professor to determine whether two songs could have been written independently). Accord,
Branch v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 819, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (expert testimony
admitted to show substantial similarity between plaintiff's cookbook and defendant's advertise-
ments). See also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, 546 F.Supp. 125, 138 (D.N.J. 1982),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986) (expert testimony admissible to show that copying has oc-
curred, but not to show that the elements taken copied were protected expression).
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and rely on juries and judges to make the distinctions they can ap-
parently make very well when shopping.
Seems as if those opposed to design protection want to have it
both ways.23
3
Furthermore, not all copyright cases require a showing of similar-
ity to determine if the defendant copied protected expression. The
copying may be admitted, with the only disputed issue being whether
the copying was authorized.23a The mere fact that evidentiary diffi-
culties might arise in some typeface copyright cases does not justify
denying protection to all typeface, including those cases where no
such difficulties would arise.
In addition, denying copyright does not succeed in eliminating
the difficulty. In the absence of copyright protection, the typeface in-
dustry has relied upon contracts between the various typeface compa-
nies to license typeface designs.2 35  A recent lawsuit between
International Typeface Corporation (ITC) and Monotype Corporation
is a case in point.236 For several years, ITC had licensed a number of
typefaces to Monotype.3 7 As a condition to the contract, Monotype
agreed that it would not market the ITC fonts under any other
name.23 In 1990 and 1991, Monotype contracted to supply Microsoft
Corporation with 35 typefaces.2 39 ITC examined samples of the type-
faces and concluded that Monotype had created the designs by copy-
ing those it had licensed from ITC.24 ITC sued for breach of contract
and Monotype defended by asserting that its typefaces were indepen-
dently created, not copied from the ITC designs.24' In the end, the
issue of similarity was as prominent in this case as if the typefaces had
233. Message from Kathleen Tinkel to J.A. Levin (Nov. 24, 1993), in Compuserve Desktop
Publishing Forum, Type & Typography section, message no. 412917 (on file with author).
234. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976)
(determination of whether defendant broadcasting company's admitted editing of plaintiff's tele-
vision comedy program was authorized creation of derivative work); Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc. v.
Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 216-17 (D. Kan. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 916
F.2d 718, rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). (determination of whether defendant's
admitted copying of plaintiff's telephone directory constituted infringement of copyright).
235. Seybold Spats, supra note 162, at 1, 3. The contractual approach provides sufficient
protection to prevent a licensee from engaging in unauthorized reproduction of the typeface that
is the subject of the contract. However, it provides no protection against unauthorized reproduc-
tion by third parties who are not bound by the contract. Hence, the availability of the contract
approach in no way obviates the need for copyright protection.
236. Monotype-ITC Suit Tests Design Originality, Tim Sa~aoLD REPORT ON DasKroP Pun-
LIsHING (Seybold Publications, Inc., Media, Pa.), Jan. 1, 1992, at 18-19.
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been protected by copyright instead of by contract.242 Denying copy-
right does not eliminate the evidentiary difficulty; it merely shifts it
from copyright law to contract law.' 3
3. Preemption of the Alphabet
Another concern is that allowing a copyright on typeface will amount
to protecting letters themselves, making any form of written commu-
nication an infringement. Framed as a constitutional issue, as it was
by the government in Eltra,24 this could be seen as a restraint on free
expression in violation of the First Amendment.245
Existing provisions in U.S. copyright law are already in place to
prevent this from being a concern. Copyright in a derivative work
such as a typeface extends only to the material contributed by the
work's author, and does not include any pre-existing material em-
ployed in the work.246 In the case of a typeface design, this means
that while the original components of a typeface are protected by
copyright, the original underlying letterforms on which the typeface is
based remain in the public domain. As noted by the district court in
Eltra,
No one suggests that the use of existing typeface designs long in
the public domain cannot adequately protect against such apprehen-
sion. The suggestion that a typeface design, an "original" work of
art whose designer is entitled to intellectual protection, must be de-
nied a copyright because of First Amendment considerations is a
242. Seybold Spats, supra note 162, at 3-4.
243. One is reminded of Professor Karl Llewellyn's famous comment: "The court must
decide the dispute that is before it. It cannot refuse because the job is hard, or dubious, or
dangerous." K. N. LLEwELLYN, TiE BRAMBLE BusH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 41 (1960).
While Professor Llewellyn was commenting on the requirement for a court to decide the dispute
before it, as distinguished from the issue of whether such a dispute should be subject to decision,
the principle is the same.
244. The defendant also argues that because typeface designs in general are the
means by which the communication of ideas in printed form is made, the copy-
righting of typeface designs ultimately will lead to restrictions not only upon use
of those designs, but also upon the free dissemination of ideas by means of
printed form. Thus such designs should be put in a category different from other
utilitarian designs. Cited in support of this are various expressions from the Gov-
ernment Printing Office and representatives of publishers.... The Government
Printing Office has expressed concern that the need to secure authorization from
copyright proprietors prior to reproduction would have an "impact on the dissemi-
nation of information contained in Government publications sold to the public."
Commercial publishers have expressed fears of potential infringement problems.
Eltra 1, 194 U.S.P.Q. at 201.
245. U.S. CONsT. amend L
246. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
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Another objection is that allowing copyright on typeface would
expose casual users of a copyrighted typeface to charges of infringe-
ment. For example, if a book was incidentally displayed in a motion
picture, would the typeface used on the book's cover provide the basis
for a suit for copyright infringement?248 Existing provisions for fair
use may or may not be sufficient to avoid this problem. For this rea-
son, the proposed amendment includes a modification to § 113,
"Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,"
to resolve the issue.
A "fair use" of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of
copyright. 49 Fair use is a case-by-case determination, and requires
the assessment of four factors: the purpose and character of the use;
the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the
copyrighted work. 5 0
247. Eltra 1, 194 U.S.P.Q. at 201.
248. House Comm. ON TM JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGrr LAW REVISION
PART 2, DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF CoPYRirHTs ON THE GEN-
ERAL PROVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 344 (Comm. Print 1963) (comment of Motion
Picture Ass'n of America, Inc.).
249. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
250. Id. Here is an example of how the four factors might be applied to the hypothetical
example posed in the text above, that of a typeface on a book cover being displayed in a com-
mercial motion picture.
1) The purpose and character of the use. Id. § 107(1). Works of a commercial nature are
less likely to be considered a fair use than are those for non-profit educational purposes. Id. The
example posed here is that of a typeface being used in a commercial motion picture. Because
this is a commercial endeavor, this factor weighs against a finding that the use is a fair use.
2) The nature of a copyrighted work. Id. § 107(2). A work that is factual in nature is
generally afforded less protection than a work of fiction or fantasy. Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985). It is difficult to predict how a court would
rule on this factor. On the one hand, as noted above, the thing that gives value to the typeface as
a copyrightable work is its aesthetic value, not its utilitarian function of making text readable. In
this case, there is an argument that this point should weigh against a finding of fair use. On the
other hand, it is arguable that the mere incidental use of the typeface in a film is not for the
purpose of aesthetics, but merely to portray the information on the object portrayed in the film.
3) Amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). This factor looks to see how much of the copyrighted work was used
in the second work. This is, of course, a very fact-specific question: did the book cover as
depicted in the motion picture use just a few letters of the typeface, or did it show most or all of
the letters? If only a few representative letters are included on the book, this factor would weigh
in favor of a finding of fair use. However, if a large amount of text is displayed in the copy-
righted typeface, this factor may argue against fair use.
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The result of a fair use analysis is difficult to predict. Many
cases would result in fair use, particularly if the fourth factor, the ef-
fect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work, were appropriately weighted. However, the analysis
necessary to permit the casual use described is somewhat convoluted,
and far from certain. Therefore, any amendment of the copyright act
to extend copyright to typeface should clarify this issue and ensure
that incidental uses could not be considered infringement. The pro-
posed legislation accomplishes this by incorporating the limitation as
an amendment to § 113:
In the case of a typeface design, it is not an infringement of copy-
right to depict an article printed with the typeface in any literary,
pictorial, graphic, or audiovisual work
5. Extension of Copyright by Republishing in a Different
Typeface
Another fear is that allowing a copyright for typeface would per-
mit an author to extend the duration of a copyright on a literary work
by republishing it in a different typeface. This point is already
avoided both by Copyright Office regulation" 1 and by statute.252
Copyright Office regulations do not allow for registration of a work
that is a mere variation of typographical ornamentation or lettering.253
Even if the new edition was considered subject to copyright as a deriv-
ative work," 4 the copyright in such a work is independent of that of
the preexisting material, and does not affect or enlarge the scope or
duration of the underlying literary work's copyright.25
4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. Id
§ 107(4). This factor has been characterized as the single most important element of fair use.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. In the case at hand, this factor is easily resolved in favor of fair
use. There is little chance of a typeface being casually depicted in a motion picture having the
result of reducing the market for that typeface. Because of the insignificant impact on the market
for the typeface, this factor would nearly always favor a finding of fair use.
251. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1992).
252. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
253. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a).
254. A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion pic-
ture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative
work."
17 U.S.C. § 101.
255. Id. § 103(b).
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6. Limitations on Distributing Printed Works
A final objection that will be discussed is the possibility that a
copyright in typeface would allow the copyright holder to halt the dis-
tribution of printed matter set in the typeface.5 6 The fear is that a
copyright holder could extort an exorbitant license fee from a pub-
lisher, effectively holding the publisher's work hostage." 7
There are two difficulties with this argument. First, as noted
above, even under current law, a typeface may be the subject of a
design patent."5 There is no reason to expect that an owner of the
copyright of a typeface is more prone to this abuse than is an owner of
a design patent covering a typeface design. Indeed, because independ-
ent creation is a defense to copyright infringement and not to patent
infringement," 9 the potential for such a threat is less for copyright
than for patent.
A second problem with this complaint is that it is not clear why
this potential for abuse is not present with any other copyright. A
publisher of a book that contains photographs, for example, would be
subject to liability should a copyrighted photograph be reproduced
without the consent of the copyright holder. It is not clear why this
fear is more pronounced with a copyright in a typeface than it is for a
copyright in a photograph.
However, it is recognized that the goal of protecting a typeface
by copyright is to prevent the typeface from being copied by other
designers, and from being embodied in a font without the authority of
the copyright holder. For that reason, as a matter of policy, it may be
desirable to ensure that the copyright holder is unable to exercise a
copyright beyond this limit, and not allow it to extend to enjoining the
publication and distribution of a book printed in the typeface. To this
256. [Use of an infringing typeface in a book] could lead to the issuance of an
injunction against the further distribution of the book and its infringing type face,
and indeed to the destruction of all existing copies produced by the publisher in
all innocence and at great expense.
15 OMNmUs CoPYRGrr RevisloN LEamt.AmE HISTORY 1194, 1197 (1977) (testimony of Irwin
Karp, Nov. 6, 1974).
257. If you were to accord copyright to typeface desigis of text matter, assuming
originality of their ornamental features, there would be placed in the hands of
copyright owners an opportunity to make egregious demands upon publishers.
You would proliferate litigation because you would proliferate putative copy-
rights. Even if publishers were to succeed in defense of such actions, they would
still have the expense of defending the lawsuits for copyright infringement.
15 O ,mous Copym= REvisIoN LE suATVE HmoRY 1217, 1220 (1977) (statement of Al-
fred H. Wasserstrom, June 12, 1975).
258. See supra, note 200 and accompanying text.
259. See supra, note 209 and text following.
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end, the proposed legislation includes the following limitation as an
amendment of § 113.
In the case of a typeface design, it is not an infringement of copy-
right... to use the typeface in the ordinary course of typing, com-
posing text, typesetting, or printing.
This limitation is similar to one incorporated into the United
Kingdom copyright statute,2"° and is similar to one that had been part
of the most recently proposed design protection bill in the United
States. 261
VI. CONCLUSION
A typeface design is an artistic work of authorship that deserves
the same copyright protection as any other artistic work. Under the
current interpretation of United States law, however, typeface is com-
pletely unprotected by copyright. Because of the Eltra decision and
its codification into Copyright Office regulations, typeface will remain
unprotected until express legislation is enacted by Congress to correct
this.
The 1980s saw an explosion in personal computing. When the
1976 Copyright Act was enacted, "desktop publishing" did not exist;
the problem of pirating typeface did not exist on any appreciable
scale. Today, as more individuals use personal computers, and fonts
and typefaces are copied and traded by countless users, the importance
of protecting the expression in typeface has increased. The legislation
proposed in this comment provides that protection.
260. "It is not an infringement of copyright in an artistic work consisting of the design of a
typeface... to use the typeface in the ordinary course of typing, composing text, typesetting or
printing.. ." Copyright Designs and Patents Act, supra note 182, § 54(I)(a).
261. "It is not an infringement of a typeface that is a design protected under this chapter to
reproduce, modify, or distribute printed materials using the typeface." H.R. 1790, supra note 2,
§ 1009(h).
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Figure 1: Times
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Figure 2: New York
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Figure 3: Courier
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Figure 6: Geneva
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Figure 7: San Francisco
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Figure 9: Koch Roman
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Figure 10: Zapf Chancery
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Figure 12: Palatino
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